June 8, 2026
Received
June 16, 2026
Read the first time
July 20, 2026
Read the second time and placed on the calendar
To authorize support for Ukraine, and for other purposes.
Section 1. Short title; table of contents
(a) Short title
This Act may be cited as the Ukraine Support Act
.
(b) Table of contents
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Title I Diplomacy and Support for Ukraine
Sec. 101. Affirming support for Ukraine
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine, violating Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, subjecting the nation to acts of aggression that have threatened its independence and security.
(2)
For three years, the people of Ukraine have demonstrated extraordinary resilience, courage, and determination in the face of relentless attacks on their homes, communities, sovereignty, and fundamental freedoms.
(3)
Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has engaged in widespread and systematic war crimes, including—
(A)
deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and evacuation corridors;
(B)
the forced deportation and kidnapping of at least 19,000 Ukrainian children to Russian-controlled territories in an attempt to erase Ukrainian identity;
(C)
the destruction of Ukraine’s agricultural and energy infrastructure to create humanitarian crises and disrupt global food supply chains; and
(D)
the use of torture, extrajudicial killings, and mass graves in occupied Ukrainian territories, as documented by the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and leading human rights organizations.
(4)
Despite these atrocities, the people of Ukraine remain unyielding, demonstrating that their spirit and commitment to self-determination cannot be extinguished.
(5)
The Russian Federation, despite its overwhelming use of force, has suffered catastrophic military losses, with estimates exceeding 800,000 casualties, illustrating that President Vladimir Putin’s war of conquest has become both a strategic failure and a humanitarian disaster for Russia.
(6)
Ukraine, despite facing an adversary with a far larger population, army, and military arsenal, continues to fight courageously for its sovereignty, demonstrating its resilience and determination.
(7)
Russia’s war has destabilized global security, undermining the principles of sovereignty and nonaggression and emboldening authoritarian regimes seeking to redraw international borders by force.
(8)
The United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union, and allied nations have demonstrated historic unity in their support for Ukraine, reaffirming their commitment to upholding international law, territorial integrity, and democratic values.
(b) Sense of congress
It is the sense of Congress that the United States—
(1)
recognizes that discussions surrounding the future of Ukraine must include Ukraine;
(2)
condemns in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation’s ongoing war crimes, its targeted destruction of Ukrainian society, and its blatant violations of international law;
(3)
reaffirms its commitment to the people of Ukraine and the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders;
(4)
urges the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and the Donbas, and affirms that any negotiations must be based on Ukraine’s sovereignty, not dictated by Russian ultimatums;
(5)
demands international institutions take decisive action to ensure the safe return of at least 19,000 kidnapped Ukrainian children, recognizing that their forced deportation is a war crime and an act of genocide under international law;
(6)
supports the continued prosecution of Vladimir Putin and Russian political and military leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, reinforcing that those who orchestrate such atrocities must be held accountable before the world; and
(7)
stresses that any sustainable peace deal must be built with Ukraine and our European allies at the table.
Sec. 102. Reaffirming the importance of NATO
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
The United States and its democratic allies and partners face unprecedented international challenges and evolving threats to global security.
(2)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded on April 4, 1949, to counter Soviet expansion, prevent further world wars in Europe, and strengthen transatlantic security, and is built on the democratic principles of freedom, security, and national sovereignty.
(3)
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty underpins the principle of collective defense
and has served as a guiding value of United States foreign policy for over 75 years.
(4)
The United States commitment to Article 5 enhances deterrence against adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran that seek to spread their malign influence.
(5)
The unity of NATO allies strengthens collective security and the stability of democratic states.
(6)
NATO serves as a bulwark against the proliferation of malign influence, technologies, and destabilizing operations by adversaries.
(7)
Authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have increased collaboration in political, economic, and security sectors to undermine democratic principles.
(8)
In the only invocation of Article 5, NATO allies provided military and intelligence support to the United States following the September 11, 2001, attacks, and many NATO allies incurred significant casualties in Afghanistan.
(9)
NATO has remained steadfast in its support for Ukraine, with member countries providing military and non-security assistance, strengthening Ukraine’s defense capabilities, and imposing costs on Russia for its illegal invasion.
(10)
Finland and Sweden made the sovereign decision to accede to NATO following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
(11)
NATO continues to address systemic challenges posed by China to Euro-Atlantic interests and security.
(12)
NATO member states have strengthened their defense and cyber capabilities, including through the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) program.
(b) Sense of congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the United States reaffirms its full and unwavering commitment to NATO;
(2)
NATO remains vital to United States national security interests and the United States remains fully committed to defending its allies under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(3)
NATO’s open door policy is essential to European security, and every sovereign state has the right to determine its security arrangements, including Ukraine;
(4)
the United States remembers and honors the thousands of NATO coalition soldiers who sacrificed their lives following the invocation of Article 5 after the September 11, 2001, attacks;
(5)
all NATO allies should dedicate at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product to national defense or establish concrete plans to meet their 2 percent obligations by the Washington Summit; and
(6)
NATO allies must continue cooperation in advanced defense technologies, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity programs to counter evolving threats from adversaries such as Russia, China, and Iran.
Sec. 103. Condemning the kidnapping of Ukrainian children
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
On January 12, 1951, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly known as the Genocide Convention
) entered into force. The Russian Federation is a party to the Convention and is therefore bound by its obligations.
(2)
On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation escalated its 8-year occupation of sovereign Ukrainian territory by launching a full-scale, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.
(3)
Russian armed forces have committed widespread and systematic atrocities against Ukrainian civilians, including the targeting of civilian infrastructure and protected sites.
(4)
On March 9, 2022, Russian forces attacked a maternity hospital in Mariupol, Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of 5 individuals and injuries to 17 others, in violation of international humanitarian law.
(5)
On March 22, 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Russian military had illegally abducted and forcibly transferred 2,389 Ukrainian children from temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation.
(6)
On June 2, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that an estimated 200,000 Ukrainian children had been forcibly transferred to Russia.
(7)
Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention defines forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
as an act of genocide.
(8)
Maria Lvova-Belova, Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of Russia, publicly admitted to overseeing the abduction and forced transfer of Ukrainian children and their adoption by Russian families.
(9)
Ukrainian authorities have stated that many abducted children have living family members in Ukraine but have been separated due to Russia’s renewed invasion.
(10)
On June 16, 2022, Russian authorities announced that children born in occupied Ukrainian territories after the February 24, 2022, invasion would automatically be deemed Russian citizens, contributing to the erasure of Ukrainian identity.
(11)
On June 22, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner verified that at least 320 children had been killed as a result of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine.
(12)
On July 11, 2022, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres ordered an investigation into the deaths and injuries of Ukrainian children in the context of the conflict.
(13)
On July 13, 2022, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken called on the Russian Federation to immediately halt its systemic filtration operations in Ukraine
, which have resulted in the disappearance, detention, or forcible deportation of between 900,000 and 1,600,000 Ukrainians, including approximately 260,000 children.
(b) Sense of congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
the abduction and forcible transfer of children and facilitation of illegal adoptions of Ukrainian children by the Russian Federation is contrary to Russia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention and constitute acts of genocide;
(2)
the Russian Federation is deliberately seeking to wipe out a generation of Ukrainian children, thereby crippling Ukraine’s ability to nurture the next generation of Ukrainian citizens and leaders and to rebuild their country after Russia’s unprovoked war, with the purpose of demolishing Ukraine’s unique language, culture, history, and identity;
(3)
the Russian Federation’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has significantly increased the risks of children being exposed to human trafficking and exploitation, child labor, gender-based violence, hunger, injury, trauma, deprivation of education and shelter, and death; and
(4)
the Government of the Russian Federation, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, bears full responsibility for the wrongful and illegal abduction and forcible transfer of children from Ukraine, and Congress condemns these actions in the strongest terms.
Sec. 104. Support for Ukraine under title II of the BUILD Act of 2018
Section 1412(c) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9612(c)) is amended—
(1)
in paragraph (1), by inserting in Ukraine and
after the provision of support under title II
; and
(2)
in paragraph (2)—
(A)
by striking The Corporation
and inserting the following:
(A) In general
The Corporation;
(B)
by striking (A) the President
and inserting the following:
(i)
the President;
(C)
by striking (B) such support
and inserting the following:
(ii)
such support; and
(D)
by adding at the end the following:
(B) Non-applicability to Ukraine
The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not apply with respect to Ukraine.
Sec. 105. Vessel war risk insurance
(a) Eligibility
Notwithstanding section 53902 of title 46, United States Code, for the period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, and ending 5 years after such date, a covered vessel shall be deemed to be eligible for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title 46, United States Code, if such vessel is engaged in transportation in waterborne commerce importing cargo to, or exporting cargo from, Ukraine.
(b) Expansion of cargo
Subparagraphs (B) through (D) of section 53903(a)(3) of title 46, United States Code, shall not apply to cargo imported or exported to or from Ukraine.
(c) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Covered vessel
The term covered vessel means a vessel that is owned by a citizen of—
(A)
a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
(B)
Ukraine; or
(C)
any other country the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation, determines, in the interest of national security, shall be considered eligible for insurance or reinsurance under chapter 539 of title 46, United States Code.
(2) Owned by a citizen
The term owned by a citizen means ownership by an entity that is considered to be a citizen of a country in the same manner as an entity is deemed to be a citizen of the United States under section 50501 of title 46, United States Code.
Sec. 106. Insurance for Ukraine Initiative
(a) Establishment
There is established in the Department of State an entity to be known as the Insurance for Ukraine Initiative
.
(b) Objectives
The objectives of the Insurance for Ukraine Initiative are the following:
(1)
Bolster confidence in Ukraine’s eventual economic recovery from Russia’s full-scale invasion through the provision of war risk insurance.
(2)
Encourage European allies and partners to finance and invest in Ukraine’s economic recovery, including through the provision of war risk insurance.
(3)
Promote closer economic integration between Ukraine and other countries in Europe as well as the United States and further Ukraine’s accession to the European Union.
(4)
Coordinate dialogue and fora for extensive outreach with private sector insurance companies relating to the provision of war risk insurance to Ukraine.
(5)
Work with Ukraine, international organizations, and Middle Eastern and African allies and partners to ensure the bountiful and affordable shipment of grain and other food commodities from Ukraine.
(c) Report
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes assessments of—
(1)
progress towards the achievement of each of the objectives set forth in subsection (b); and
(2)
legislative proposals that would further the objectives set forth in subsection (b).
(d) Diplomatic and political support
The Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall seek to provide diplomatic and political support to countries that provide or provide support for war risk insurance for Ukraine, including by using the diplomatic and political influence and expertise of the Department of State to build the capacity of such countries.
(e) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
Sec. 107. Codification of a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction
(a) In general
There is established within the Department of State a Special Coordinator for Ukrainian Reconstruction.
(b) Selection
The Special Coordinator shall be chosen by the Secretary of State and shall report directly to the Secretary.
(c) Qualifications
The Special Coordinator shall be an individual with—
(1)
private sector experience; and
(2)
knowledge of Ukraine and foreign policy pertaining thereto.
(d) Duties
The Special Coordinator shall assist in—
(1)
harnessing the tools of different agencies of the United States Government to promote the reconstruction of Ukraine;
(2)
coordinate cooperation amongst different agencies and bureaus of the United States Government to aid the recovery of Ukraine following its war to protect its sovereignty; and
(3)
work with the United States Development Finance Corporation to mobilize private capital for the reconstruction of Ukraine.
Sec. 108. Support for Radio Free Europe
(a) Sense of congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty shall be immediately restored to its full capacity and operational position prior to Executive order attempting to shutter the agency;
(2)
Radio Free Europe provides reliable, uncensored, and accessible news and reporting in Ukraine and other countries where media freedom is restricted;
(3)
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is one of the most critical sources of unrestricted, independent news and reporting for audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation;
(4)
the Government of the Russian Federation has engaged in systematic targeting of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reporters inside the Russian Federation, which has negatively impacted the organization’s ability to provide timely, reliable, and accurate news from inside the country; and
(5)
despite pressure from the Government of the Russian Federation, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s audience continues to grow inside the Russian Federation and surrounding countries.
(b) Authorization of appropriations
There is authorized to be appropriated $250,000,000 for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for fiscal year 2026.
(c) Authorization of new bureaus
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty may explore opening new bureaus to help expand its ability to reach audiences on the periphery of the Russian Federation.
(d) Initiatives To bolster radio free europe/Radio liberty bureaus around russian federation’s periphery
To help expand its reach to Russian-speaking audiences and increase its reach to audiences through digital media, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty should—
(1)
evaluate where Russian disinformation is most deeply pervasive in the Eurasia region;
(2)
develop strategies to better communicate with predominately Russian-speaking regions;
(3)
build on efforts to increase capacity and programming to counter disinformation in real time;
(4)
expand Russian language investigative journalism;
(5)
improve the technical capacity of the Ukraine bureau; and
(6)
continue efforts to increase digital news services.
(e) Report required
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes—
(1)
recommendations of locations to open new bureaus to help reach new audiences in the broader Eurasia region;
(2)
an assessment of current staffing and anticipated staffing needs in order to effectively reach audiences in the broader Eurasia region; and
(3)
an assessment of the impact of the Government of the Russian Federation closing down Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty within the Russian Federation.
(f) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
Sec. 109. Authorizing programs to counter and combat Russian disinformation activities
(a) Countering russian influence fund
The Secretary of State should use funds available for obligation in the Countering Russian Influence Fund—
(1)
to prioritize assisting Ukraine to detect and combat disinformation from the Russian Federation and its proxies; and
(2)
to assist the Government of Ukraine in developing new defense strategies and technologies.
(b) Strategy required
(1) In general
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a plan for countering and combating disinformation by the Russian Federation and supporting free and independent media in Ukraine that includes—
(A)
a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine in combating and responding to malign influence operations of the Russian Federation aimed at inflaming tensions and dividing Ukrainian society;
(B)
an assessment of effective efforts and programs to improve media literacy in Ukraine and recommendations for how the United States can assist in supporting and expanding those programs;
(C)
a plan to assist the Government of Ukraine improve efforts to detect and remove content originating from Russian troll farms, bots, and other sources aimed at sowing division and disseminating disinformation in Ukraine or targeting Ukrainian audiences;
(D)
recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets, including Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; and
(E)
recommendations to increase support for independent media outlets catering to Russian-speaking populations residing in Russian-occupied Crimea, the Donbas region of Ukraine, and throughout Ukraine.
(2) Form
The strategy required by paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex if necessary.
Sec. 110. Establishment of Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund
(a) In general
Subchapter A of chapter 98 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
9512. Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund
(a) Creation of trust fund
There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the
Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund, consisting of such amounts as may be appropriated to such fund as provided in this section.(b) Transfers to trust fund
There are hereby appropriated to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund amounts equivalent to the net revenues received in the Treasury from the taxes imposed under section 892A.
(c) Expenditures from trust fund
Amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be available, as provided in appropriations Acts, only to the Secretary of State for purposes of—
(1)
reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in Ukraine,
(2)
humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine,
(3)
fostering long-term economic growth and private sector development in Ukraine, and
(4)
bolstering transparent and accountable governance of the Ukrainian economy.
(d) Trust fund not interest-Bearing
Section 9602(b) shall not apply to the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund.
(e) Requirements under foreign assistance act of 1961
Any assistance made available from amounts in the Ukraine Reconstruction Trust Fund shall be subject to all applicable requirements for the provision of such assistance for the same or similar purpose authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), including requirements under such Act relating to administrative authorities, congressional notifications, and reporting.
(b) Clerical amendment
The table of sections for subchapter A of chapter 98 of such Code is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
(c) Report
(1) In general
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the use of any funds made available from the Ukrainian Reconstruction Trust Fund.
(2) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.
Sec. 111. United States-European Nuclear Energy Cooperation
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine which has severely threatened energy security in the United States, Europe, and around the world.
(2)
The security of Ukraine’s energy grid has been vital to Ukraine’s success in its defense of its territory and ensuring the Ukrainian government can effectively provide goods and services to Ukrainian citizens.
(3)
Ukraine has operated four nuclear power plants with 15 reactors, primarily Russian-designed water-water energetic reactor (VVER) reactors.
(4)
Russia, in its war of aggression against Ukraine, has systematically targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure through heavy shelling and targeted attacks, particularly in the winter months when innocent Ukrainian civilians are most vulnerable.
(5)
Since March 2022, Russian forces have illegally occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, and Russian forces have surrounded the station with landmines, further threatening regional security.
(6)
Russian-designed VVER reactors have been built across Europe, including in Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
(7)
Russia uses its nuclear power plant designs and fuel services to spread malign influence and threaten United States and European energy security.
(8)
As of 2021, Russia owned about 20 percent of the total uranium conversion infrastructure worldwide and in 2020, had the largest uranium enrichment capacity at close to 46 percent.
(b) Sense of Congress
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1)
in countries seeking or developing a nuclear power industry, the Department of State should prioritize the utilization of products and services from the United States, and then prioritize products and services from Europe and other allied or partner countries, including Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea when not directly competing with the United States;
(2)
the United States and its allies must focus on cooperation, including capacity building and early-stage project support, to expand the nuclear industry in Europe in a way that maintains nonproliferation, security, and safety standards and aligns with international obligations and treaties while combating Russian and Chinese malign influence; and
(3)
the United States should continue to pursue the Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program as a means of helping partner countries meet their clean energy needs with scalable, flexible, secure, and safe nuclear power programs.
(c) Strategy required
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall develop a strategy to strengthen United States-European nuclear energy cooperation and combat Russian malign influence in the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
(d) Elements
The strategy required by subsection (c) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(1)
An overview and assessment of the Secretary of State’s efforts to broaden participation by United States nuclear industry entities in Europe and promote the accessibility and competitiveness of United States, European, and partner technologies and services against Russian and Chinese technologies in Europe.
(2)
An overview of different nuclear reactor types that are currently deployed or under regulatory review in Europe, including large light-water reactors, small modular light-water reactors, and non-light-water reactors, and—
(A)
what role, if any, each reactor type could have in reducing Russia’s influence over European energy supply by 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, and 2050;
(B)
challenges that each reactor type may face with rapid deployment, including costs, market barriers to first-of-a-kind designs, supply chain constraints, and regulatory requirements;
(C)
the impacts of each reactor type on maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, including the minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material; and
(D)
opportunities for the use of United States, European, and partner technologies and services in the deployment or potential deployment of each reactor type.
(3)
An overview of different fuel cycles that are currently deployed or under consideration in Europe, including use of low enriched uranium, including high assay low enriched uranium, and spent fuel reprocessing, along with an analysis of the implications of each fuel cycle on—
(A)
reducing and eliminating Russia’s market share in Europe for uranium, conversion, enrichment, and reactor fuel between now and 2030;
(B)
achieving long-term energy security free of Russian influence; and
(C)
maintaining strong nonproliferation standards, including the minimization of weapons-usable material as well as high nuclear safety and security standards.
(4)
An overview of nuclear reactor designs and fuel cycle infrastructure that the United States Government is currently funding the development of, and—
(A)
the potential, if any, that each of these technologies have to decrease or eliminate Russia’s market share in the United States and Europe for nuclear power reactors, uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, deconversion, and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing in the short-, medium-, and long-term;
(B)
the impact of these technologies on the minimization of weapons-usable nuclear material, including the use of highly enriched uranium or plutonium fuels; and
(C)
an assessment of the use cases for each of these designs and fuel cycles.
(5)
An overview of the United States Government’s diplomatic engagements regarding the nuclear energy sector in Europe.
(6)
A list of countries in Europe with active nuclear power programs, and—
(A)
an analysis of each country’s nuclear energy policy;
(B)
an overview of existing areas of cooperation with regards to nuclear energy between each country and—
(i)
the United States;
(ii)
other European and friendly countries; and
(iii)
adversarial countries including China and Russia;
(C)
an overview of potential areas for future cooperation between each country and the United States with regards to nuclear energy; and
(D)
a summary of fuel types used in each country’s nuclear power programs.
(7)
An overview of Russian and Chinese influence in the European nuclear energy sector.
(8)
An overview of how the United States Government is working with allies and partners to counter Russian malign influence within the European energy sector to include steps taken to counter Russian influence in the mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication processes as well as in reactor construction.
(9)
An overview of how the United States Government balances the urgent strategic need for collaboration with allies and partners on countering Russia’s influence on nuclear energy in Europe, with commercial competitiveness issues that may arise between United States companies and companies in Europe, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
(10)
An assessment of Rosatom’s role in Russia’s energy sector, to include an overview of strengths and vulnerabilities of the conglomerate.
(e) Submission
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy required by subsection (c).
(f) Form
The strategy required by subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified strategy.
(g) Authorization of appropriations
There is authorized to be appropriated $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2025 through 2029 to support critically needed engagement in Europe consistent with the strategy required by subsection (c) on countering Russian malign influence and with a particular focus on responsible nuclear power program capacity building, early stage nuclear power project support, and countering Russian disinformation campaigns.
(h) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives;
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate;
(C)
the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of the Representatives; and
(D)
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate.
(2) High assay low enriched uranium
The term high assay low enriched uranium means uranium enriched so that the concentration of the fissile isotope uranium–235 (U–235) is between 5 percent and 20 percent of the mass of uranium.
(3) Low enriched uranium
The term low enriched uranium means fuel in which the weight percent of U–235 in the uranium is less than 20 percent.
Title II Security assistance
Sec. 201. Lend-lease authority
Section 2 of the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022 (Public Law 117–118; 136 Stat. 1184) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a)(1), by striking fiscal years 2022 and 2023
and inserting fiscal years 2022 through 2028
;
(2)
by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(3)
by inserting after subsection (b) the following new subsection:
(c) Report
Not later than 90 days after any use of the authority provided by subsection (a), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to Congress a report that includes—
(1)
a description of the defense articles loaned or leased to the Government of Ukraine, or to the government of an Eastern European country impacted by the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine, under such authority; and
(2)
a strategy and timeline for recovery and return of such defense articles.
Sec. 202. Direct loans and foreign military financing
(a) Direct loans
(1) In general
Through fiscal year 2026, direct loans under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act may be made available for Ukraine and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, notwithstanding section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, gross obligations for the principal amounts of which shall not exceed $8,000,000,000.
(2) Other unobligated balances
The unobligated balances of amounts made available by any Act making appropriations for the Department of State, foreign operations, and related programs, under the heading International Security Assistance—Funds Appropriated to the President—Foreign Military Financing
shall also be made available for the cost of loans and loan guarantees as authorized by this section.
(b) Terms and conditions
The terms and conditions described in section 2606 of the Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2022 (division N of Public Law 117–103) shall apply to amounts made available by this section in the same manner and to the same extent as amounts made available by such section except that subsection (b) of such section shall be applied by striking $4,000,000,000
and inserting $8,000,000,000
.
(c) Emergency designation
Amounts repurposed pursuant to this section that were previously designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget or the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, are designated by the Congress as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985: Provided, That such amounts shall be available only if the President designates such amounts as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i).
Sec. 203. Support for Baltic countries
(a) Assistance authorized
The Secretary of State shall carry out programs, projects, and activities to build the capacity of the national militaries and border guard forces of Baltic countries, pursuant to the 2024 Bilateral Defense Cooperation Roadmaps for 2024–2028, which provide for the promotion of defense cooperation in integrated air and missile defense, maritime domain awareness, cyber, irregular warfare, participation in international military operations and exercises, infrastructure development, and training
.
(b) Authorization of appropriations
There is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State, for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and 2028, in addition to amounts already authorized to be appropriated for such purposes to carry out the assistance described in subsection (a)—
(1)
$30,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing grants authorized under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) for each Baltic country; and
(2)
$4,000,000 for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs, including as authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for each Baltic country.
(c) Briefing
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives regarding—
(1)
the most pressing security needs of Baltic countries;
(2)
a plan for the disbursement of funds so obligated; and
(3)
an analysis of European and other allied country support for Baltic countries.
Sec. 204. Extension of Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
Section 1250 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114–92; 129 Stat. 1068) is amended—
(1)
in subsection (f), by adding at the end the following:
(11)
For fiscal year 2026, $300,000,000.
(12)
For fiscal year 2027, $300,000,000.; and
(2)
in subsection (h), by striking December 31, 2026
and inserting December 31, 2027
.
Sec. 205. Report on allied and partner military contributions
(a) In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report including—
(1)
a detailed description of all military contributions made or planned by allied and partner countries, disaggregated by country, including details of types and quantities of platforms and systems provided;
(2)
a description and analysis of military capabilities identified as current Ukrainian operational needs; and
(3)
a description of United States efforts to meet identified Ukrainian operational needs through transfers of United States arms and military equipment or through support and facilitation of allied and partner transfer of arms and military equipment.
(b) Form
The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex that is submitted separately from the unclassified portion.
(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Sec. 206. Report on United States-Ukraine intelligence support and cooperation
(a) In general
Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees, a report including—
(1)
a detailed description of current United States intelligence support and cooperation to and with Ukrainian military and intelligence services;
(2)
a description and analysis of the consequences of ceasing such intelligence support and cooperation to Ukraine, including as related to targeting, battlefield effectiveness, early warning capabilities, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity; and
(3)
a description of United States efforts and initiatives currently underway or planned to increase Ukrainian intelligence, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity capabilities.
(b) Form
The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form.
(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Title III Sanctions and export controls
Sec. 301. Sanctions trigger determination
Not later than 15 days after the date of enactment of this Act, and at minimum every 90 days thereafter, the President shall make a determination as to whether the Russian Federation or any proxy thereof, is engaged in—
(1)
conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine; or
(2)
refusing to sincerely and actually negotiate a peace agreement with Ukraine; or
(3)
acting in violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.
Sec. 302. Imposition of sanctions with respect to Russian financial institutions
(a) Imposition of sanctions
(1) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to 3 or more of the following financial institutions:
(A)
Sberbank.
(B)
VTB.
(C)
Gazprombank.
(D)
VEB.RF.
(E)
The Russian Direct Investment Fund.
(F)
Credit Bank of Moscow.
(G)
Alfa Bank.
(H)
Rosselkhozbank.
(I)
FC Bank Otkritie.
(J)
Promsvyazbank.
(K)
Sovcombank.
(L)
Transkapitalbank.
(M)
The Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
(2) Subsidiaries and successor entities
The President may impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to any subsidiary of, or successor entity to, a financial institution specified in paragraph (1).
(b) Additional russian financial institutions
(1) List required
Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—
(A)
are significant financial institutions owned or operated by the Government of the Russian Federation; and
(B)
should be sanctioned in the interest of United States national security.
(2) Imposition of sanctions
Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310(a)(1) with respect to each foreign person identified on the list.
Sec. 303. Impositions of sanctions with respect to Russian oil and mining industry
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all Russian companies operating primarily in any of the following sectors:
(1)
Oil and gas extraction, refinement, or production.
(2)
Coal extraction mining, refinement, or production.
(3)
Mineral extraction and processing.
Sec. 304. Imposition of sanctions on certain persons affiliated with or supporting the Government of the Russian Federation
(a) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all individuals listed under subsection (b) or included in the additional lists under subsection (c).
(b) Officials specified
The officials specified in this subsection are the following:
(1)
The President of the Russian Federation.
(2)
The Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.
(3)
The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.
(4)
The Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.
(5)
The Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation.
(6)
The Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation.
(7)
The Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation.
(8)
The Minister of Energy and Trade of the Russian Federation.
(9)
The Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation.
(10)
The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.
(11)
The Deputy Minister of Transport of the Russian Federation.
(12)
The Deputy Energy Minister of the Russian Federation.
(13)
The Deputy Finance Minister of the Russian Federation.
(14)
The Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation.
(15)
The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
(16)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces of the Russian Federation.
(17)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation.
(18)
The Commander of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation.
(19)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy of the Russian Federation.
(20)
The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation.
(21)
The Commander of the Special Operations Forces of the Russian Federation.
(22)
The Commander of Logistical Support of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
(c) Additional officials
(1) List required
Not later than 30 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301 and every 90 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a list of foreign persons that the President determines—
(A)
are—
(i)
senior officials of any branch of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation leading any of the operations described in section 302; or
(ii)
senior officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, including any intelligence agencies or security services of the Russian Federation, with significant roles in planning or implementing such operations; and
(B)
with respect to which sanctions should be imposed in the interest of the national security of the United States.
(2) Imposition of sanctions
Upon the submission of each list required by paragraph (1), the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 310 with respect to each foreign person on the list.
Sec. 305. Crimea tunnel sanctions
(a) Findings
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
In February and March 2014, the Russian Federation invaded the Crimean peninsula and annexed Crimea, internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory.
(2)
Following its annexation of Crimea, the Russian Federation constructed the Kerch Strait Bridge to connect the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.
(3)
On February 24, 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation, led by Vladimir Putin, launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
(4)
The Russian Federation has used Crimea as an integral part of its full scale invasion of Ukraine, including to house Russian troops, store ammunition and weapons, and host the Black Sea Fleet.
(5)
In October 2023, it was publicly reported that Russian and Chinese business officials met and exchanged emails to discuss building a tunnel from the Russian mainland to illegally occupied Crimea.
(b) Imposition of sanctions
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons that knowingly participate in the construction, maintenance, or repair of a tunnel or bridge that connects the Russian mainland with the Crimean peninsula.
Sec. 306. Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant sanctions
(a) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons that have endangered the integrity, safety, or undermined Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station located in southeastern Ukraine since the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
(b) Exception related to ukrainian operational control
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any foreign person seeking to reestablish Ukrainian operational control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station or the surrounding region.
Sec. 307. Rosatom sanctions
(a) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to—
(1)
Rosatom;
(2)
Rosatom subsidiaries; and
(3)
a foreign person that knowingly directly or indirectly engages in any significant transaction for nuclear reactor construction and related services with Rosatom.
(b) Waiver
The President may waive the application of sanctions for a transaction or transactions with a United States person, a foreign person, or a foreign financial institution (as the case may be) described under this section if—
(1)
the President determines that the transaction relates to activities necessary to the production of medical isotopes or industrial isotopes; and
(2)
the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that—
(A)
domestic medical isotope or industrial isotope production is insufficient to meet United States patient and industry requirements; and
(B)
the United States is taking measurable steps to establish medical isotope or industrial isotope supply chains that are not reliant on Rosatom or other Russian source material.
Sec. 308. Imposition of price cap vessel sanctions
(a) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any foreign vessel that knowingly transports Russian oil in contravention of the Russian oil price cap policy.
(b) Exception for safety of vessels and crew
Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to a person providing provisions to a vessel otherwise subject to sanctions under this section if such provisions are intended for the safety and care of the crew aboard the vessel, the protection of human life aboard the vessel, or the maintenance of the vessel to avoid any environmental or other significant damage.
(c) Strategy
Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a strategy to enhance international compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy.
(d) Matters
The strategy under subsection (a) shall include—
(1)
an overview of general international compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy;
(2)
a list of the countries known to have purchased significant quantities of Russian oil at prices above the price agreed to in the Russian oil price cap policy set forth by the Group of Seven (G7
) nations;
(3)
any known methods used by such countries to avoid detection of their purchases of Russian oil at prices above the price agreed to in the Russian oil price cap policy;
(4)
an assessment of possible incentives the United States could provide to countries listed pursuant to paragraph (2) to encourage compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy;
(5)
an assessment of whether the imposition of additional sanctions, including possible secondary sanctions, would enhance international compliance with the Russian oil price cap policy;
(6)
a description of the views of the government of each country participating in the Russian oil price cap policy regarding whether the price cap under such policy should be lowered or not; and
(7)
a description of the United States diplomatic engagement with the government of each country participating in the Russian oil price cap policy regarding the appropriateness of the current cap, including any diplomatic engagement intended to encourage support for the lowering of the price cap.
Sec. 309. SWIFT sanctions
(a) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to any global communication financial service that does not cease the provision of financial communication messaging services to any financial institution listed under section 302 of this Act.
(b) Enabling or facilitation of access to specialized financial messaging services through intermediary financial institutions
For purposes of this section, enabling or facilitating direct or indirect access to specialized financial messaging services includes doing so by serving as an intermediary financial institution with access to such messaging services.
Sec. 310. Russian sovereign debt sanctions
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 302 and not later than 30 days following such a determination, the President shall prohibit all transactions by United States persons involving the sovereign debt of the Government of the Russian Federation issued on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, including governmental bonds.
Sec. 311. Imposition of sanctions on Russia-North Korea cooperation
(a) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to the following:
(1)
Any foreign person that is responsible for or facilitates the transfer or sale of arms or material support from North Korea to be used in Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.
(2)
Any foreign person that knowingly, directly or indirectly, imports, exports, or reexports to, into, or from North Korea any goods services or technology for weapons that may be used by Russian forces or their proxies in Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.
(3)
Any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for a foreign person described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4)
Any foreign person that engages in a significant transaction related to the transfer or sale of arms or material support with a foreign person described in paragraph (1) or (2) or foreign financial institution described in paragraph (3).
(5)
Any foreign person assisting in the logistical supply and movement of North Korean personnel, arms or material support to be used in Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.
(b) Report
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes significant activities by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to support the Russian Federation and its proxies in Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.
(c) Matters To be included
The report required by this section shall include the following:
(1)
The number of North Korean troops that have been sent to fight Ukraine, casualties inflicted on these troops, and the impact on the battlefield of having North Korean military personnel on the frontlines.
(2)
The identity and nationality of foreign persons and foreign financial institutions that are subject to sanctions under section 317.
(3)
A description of the conduct engaged in by such persons and institutions.
(4)
An assessment of the extent to which a foreign government has provided material support to the Government of North Korea or any person acting for or on behalf of that government to conduct significant activities to materially support Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.
(5)
A United States strategy to counter North Korea’s efforts to conduct significant activities to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, that includes efforts to engage foreign governments to halt the capability of the Government of North Korea and persons acting for or on behalf of that government to conduct significant activities supporting Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine.
(d) Form
The report required by this section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
Sec. 312. Sanctions for kidnapping Ukrainian children
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301 and not later than 15 days following such a determination, the President shall impose the sanctions described in section 317 with respect to all foreign persons that have directed or in anyway participated in the kidnapping and wrongful patriation of Ukrainian children.
Sec. 313. Imposition of dual-use export controls
(a) In general
Upon making an affirmative determination under section 301, a foreign-produced item shall be subject to the Export Administration Regulations (pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)) if the item—
(1)
meets—
(A)
the product scope requirements described in subsection (b); and
(B)
the destination scope requirements described in subsection (c); and
(2)
is exported, reexported, or in-country transferred to the Russia Federation from abroad or involves the Government of the Russian Federation.
(b) Product scope requirements
A foreign-produced item meets the product scope requirements of this subsection if the item—
(1)
is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number; or
(2)
is produced by any plant or major component of a plant that is located outside the United States, if the plant or major component of a plant, whether made in the United States or a foreign country, itself is a direct product of United States-origin technology or software subject to the Export Administration Regulations that is specified in a covered Export Control Classification Number.
(c) Destination scope requirements
A foreign-produced item meets the destination scope requirements of this subsection if there is knowledge that the foreign-produced item is destined to the Russian Federation or will be incorporated into or used in the production or development of any part, component, or equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations and produced in or destined to the Russian Federation.
(d) Licensing policy
In carrying out this section, the Secretary of Commerce shall apply a presumption that an export, reexport, release, or in-country transfer of items meets the product scope requirements set forth in subsection (b) and the destination scope requirements set forth in subsection (c).
(e) Exceptions
The license requirements set forth in this section shall not apply to—
(1)
food, medicine, or medical devices that are—
(A)
designated as EAR99; or
(B)
not designated under or listed on the Commerce Control List; or
(2)
services, software, or hardware (other than services, software, or hardware for end-users owned or controlled by the Government of Iran) that are—
(A)
necessarily and ordinarily incident to communications; or
(B)
designated as—
(i)
EAR99; or
(ii)
Export Control Classification Number 5A992.c or 5D992.c, and classified in accordance with section 740.17 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; and
(C)
subject to a general license issued by the Department of Commerce or Department of Treasury.
(f) Department of commerce strategy
(1) Strategy required
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce (in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a strategy to prevent the illegal export to Iran by United States persons regarding technologies used or that may be used in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems by Iran, including the following microelectronics:
(A)
Microcontrollers.
(B)
Voltage regulators.
(C)
Digital signal controllers.
(D)
GPS modules.
(E)
Microprocessors.
(2) Elements
The strategy under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(A)
A process for the Secretary of Commerce (in coordination with the Secretaries and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively identify—
(i)
current and emerging technologies used or that may be used by Iran in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems (including critical components thereof);
(ii)
United States manufacturers of such technologies; and
(iii)
foreign manufacturers and proliferators of such technologies.
(B)
A process for the Secretary of Commerce (in coordination with the Secretaries and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively identify third-party distributors and resellers of the technologies specified in subparagraph (A)(i) that, through the use of intermediaries with no or nominal operations or assets, or through other mechanisms, contrive to circumvent export controls for such items with respect to Iran.
(C)
A methodology for the Secretary of Commerce to proactively engage the United States manufacturers identified pursuant to the process under subparagraph (A)(ii), to provide such manufacturers with timely updates to the list of third-party distributors and resellers identified pursuant to the process under subparagraph (B).
(3) Submission
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy under paragraph (1).
(4) Form
The report required by subsection (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but portions of the report described in paragraphs (1) and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified report.
(g) Department of state strategy
(1) Strategy required
The Secretary of State (in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a strategy to prevent the export to Iran of technologies from the United States and allied and partner countries which are used, or may be used, by Iran in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems (including the microelectronics listed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of subsection (a)(1)).
(2) Elements
The strategy under paragraph (1) shall include, at a minimum, the following elements:
(A)
A process for the Secretary of State (in consultation with the relevant Secretaries and heads specified in paragraph (1)) to proactively identify foreign manufacturers of the technologies referred to in such paragraph.
(B)
A process for the Secretary of State to engage with any ally or partner of the United States regarding technologies which have been incorporated into an unmanned aircraft system produced by Iran, for the purpose of synchronizing the export control regime of such ally or partner with the United States export controls developed by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the strategy under subsection (a) with respect to such technology.
(3) Submission
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the strategy under paragraph (1).
(4) Form
The report required by subsection (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but portions of the report described in paragraphs (1) and (2) may contain a classified annex, so long as such annex is provided separately from the unclassified report.
(h) Requirement for secretary of defense To develop range of options
(1) In general
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense (in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence) shall develop a range of options that may be employed by the Armed Forces of the United States to counter or otherwise deny Iran the ability to acquire technologies used, or that may be used, in the design, development, production, or operational employment of unmanned aircraft systems by Iran, including the following technologies:
(A)
Microcontrollers.
(B)
Voltage regulators.
(C)
Digital signal controllers.
(D)
GPS modules.
(E)
Microprocessors.
(F)
Computer Aided Design (CAD) software.
(G)
Computer numerical control machines.
(2) Briefing
Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the options developed under paragraph (1).
Sec. 314. Duties on the Russian Federation
(a) In general
Not later than 15 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, the President shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law, increase the rate of duty for all goods and services imported into the United States from the Russian Federation to a rate of not less 500 percent ad valorem.
(b) Report
Not later than 60 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, the President shall submit to the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, a report indicating the impact of these ad valorem tariffs on exports to the United States.
Sec. 315. Ending Russian oil import loophole
(a) In general
The Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (Public Law 117–109; 136 Stat. 1154) is amended—
(1)
by redesignating section 3 as section 4; and
(2)
by inserting after section 2 the following:
3. Prohibition on importation of energy products produced at refineries outside the Russian Federation
All products classified under chapter 27 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule that were produced at any refinery that uses crude oil originating in the Russian Federation shall be banned from importation into the United States.
(b) Conforming amendments
Section 4 of the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act (Public Law 117–109; 136 Stat. 1154), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1), is amended—
(1)
in subsection (a), by inserting or 3
after section 2
; and
(2)
in subsection (c)(1), by inserting or 3
after section 2
.
Sec. 316. Taxing capital gains on Russian sovereign assets
(a) In general
Not later than 15 days after making an affirmative determination under section 301, notwithstanding any other provision of law, there is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the disqualified income of any specified foreign government a tax equal to 100 percent thereof.
(b) Withholding
(1) In general
Notwithstanding section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (or any other provision of law), any person having control, receipt, custody, disposal, or payment of disqualified income with respect to which tax is imposed under subsection (a) shall deduct and withhold from such income a tax equal to 100 percent thereof.
(2) Application of certain rules
For purposes of subchapter B of chapter 3, section 33, and such other provisions as the Secretary may provide, paragraph (1) shall be treated as part of subchapter A of chapter 3.
(c) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1) Disqualified income
The term disqualified income means any interest or dividends payable with respect to assets which are blocked using the authorities provided by section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
(2) Specified foreign government
The term specified foreign government means the foreign governments (within the meaning of section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and the regulations issued thereunder) of Russia and Belarus.
(d) Override of treaty obligations
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section (and the amendments made by this section) shall apply without regard to any treaty obligation of the United States.
(e) Effective date
The amendments made by this section shall apply to interest and dividends received after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Sec. 317. Sanctions described
The sanctions described in this section are the following:
(1) Property blocking
The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Aliens inadmissible for visas, admission, or parole
(A) Visas, admission, or parole
In the case of an alien, the alien is—
(i)
inadmissible to the United States;
(ii)
ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii)
otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked
(i) In general
The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subparagraph (A) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect
A revocation under clause (i) shall—
(I)
take effect immediately; and
(II)
automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the alien’s possession.
(3) Loans from international financial institutions
The President shall direct the United States Executive Director of each international financial institution to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to oppose any loan, loan guarantee, or equity investment from the international financial institution that would directly or indirectly benefit the sanctioned foreign person.
Sec. 318. Implementation; regulations; penalties
(a) Implementation
The President may exercise all authorities provided to the President under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this title.
(b) Regulations
The President shall issue such regulations, licenses, and orders as are necessary to carry out this title.
(c) Penalties
A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this Act or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this title shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705(b) and 1705(c)).
Sec. 319. Exceptions; waiver
(a) Exceptions
(1) Exception to comply with international obligations
Sanctions described in section 317(2) shall not apply with respect to the admission of an alien if admitting or paroling the alien into the United States is necessary to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations.
(2) Exception relating to the provision of humanitarian assistance
Sanctions under this title may not be imposed with respect to transactions or the facilitation of transactions for—
(A)
the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices; or
(B)
the provision of humanitarian assistance; or
(C)
financial transactions relating to humanitarian assistance;
(3) Exception for intelligence, law enforcement, and national security activities
Sanctions under this title shall not apply to any authorized intelligence, law enforcement, or national security activities of the United States.
(b) National security waiver
The President may waive the imposition of sanctions under this title with respect to a person if the President—
(1)
determines that such a waiver is in the extraordinarily vital to the national security of the United States; and
(2)
submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a notification of the waiver and the reasons for the waiver no less than 15 days before the use of the waiver.
Sec. 320. Termination
(a) In general
The President may terminate the application of sanctions, export controls, duties, prohibitions, or penalties under this title if the President certifies to Congress that the Russian Federation has ceased conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine or act in violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.
(b) Reimposition
The President shall immediately reimpose all previous terminated sanctions, export controls, duties, prohibitions, and penalties imposed under this title should the Russian Federation restart a war of aggression against Ukraine or act in violation of a negotiated peace agreement with Ukraine.
Sec. 321. Congressional review of Russia sanctions
(a) Submission to congress of proposed action
(1) In general
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, before taking any action described in paragraph (2), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees and leadership a report that describes the proposed action and the reasons for that action.
(2) Actions described
(A) In general
An action described in this paragraph is—
(i)
an action to terminate the application of any sanction, export control, duty, or prohibition described in subparagraph (B);
(ii)
with respect to sanctions, export controls, duties, or prohibitions described in subparagraph (B) imposed by the President with respect to a person, an action to waive the application of those sanctions with respect to that person; or
(iii)
a licensing action that significantly alters United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(B) Sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions described
The sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions described in this subparagraph are sanctions, export controls, duties, and prohibitions with respect to Russia provided for under—
(i)
this Act;
(ii)
Executive Order 13849 (22 U.S.C. 9521 note; relating to authorizing the implementation of certain sanctions set forth in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9401 et seq.));
(iii)
Executive Order 13883 (22 U.S.C. 5605 note; relating to administration of proliferation sanctions and amendment of Executive Order 12851 (22 U.S.C. 2797 note; relating to the administration of proliferation sanctions, Middle East arms control, and related congressional reporting responsibilities));
(iv)
Executive Order 14024 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation);
(v)
Executive Order 14039 (22 U.S.C. 9526 note; relating to blocking property with respect to certain Russian energy export pipelines);
(vi)
Executive Order 14065 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to continued Russian efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine);
(vii)
Executive Order 14066 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting certain imports and new investments with respect to continued Russian Federation efforts to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine);
(viii)
Executive Order 14068 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting certain imports, exports, and new investment with respect to continued Russian Federation aggression);
(ix)
Executive Order 14071 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to prohibiting new investment in and certain services to the Russian Federation in response to continued Russian Federation aggression); and
(x)
Executive Order 14114 (88 Fed. Reg. 89271; relating to taking additional steps with respect to the Russian Federation’s harmful activities).
(3) Description of type of action
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) shall include a description of whether the action—
(A)
is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia; or
(B)
is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(4) Inclusion of additional matter
(A) In general
Each report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia shall include a description of—
(i)
the significant alteration to United States foreign policy with respect to Russia;
(ii)
the anticipated effect of the action on the national security interests of the United States; and
(iii)
the policy objectives for which the sanctions affected by the action were initially imposed.
(B) Requests from banking and financial services committees
The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate or the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives may request the submission to the Committee of the matter described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a report submitted under paragraph (1) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(5) Confidentiality of proprietary information
Proprietary information that can be associated with a particular person with respect to an action described in paragraph (2) may be included in a report submitted under paragraph (1) only if the appropriate congressional committees and leadership provide assurances of confidentiality, unless that person otherwise consents in writing to such disclosure.
(6) Rule of construction
Paragraph (2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to require the submission of a report under paragraph (1) with respect to the routine issuance of a license that does not significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(b) Period for review by congress
(1) In general
During the period of 30 calendar days beginning on the date on which the President submits a report under subsection (a)(1)—
(A)
in the case of a report that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report; and
(B)
in the case of a report that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives should, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to fully review the report.
(2) Exception
The period for congressional review under paragraph (1) of a report required to be submitted under subsection (a)(1) shall be 60 calendar days if the report is submitted on or after July 10 and on or before September 7 in any calendar year.
(3) Limitation on actions during initial congressional review period
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during the period for congressional review provided for under paragraph (1) of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2), including any additional period for such review as applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not take that action unless a joint resolution of approval with respect to that action is enacted in accordance with subsection (c).
(4) Limitation on actions during presidential consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action for a period of 12 calendar days after the date of passage of the joint resolution of disapproval.
(5) Limitation on actions during congressional reconsideration of a joint resolution of disapproval
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) passes both Houses of Congress in accordance with subsection (c), and the President vetoes the joint resolution, the President may not take that action for a period of 10 calendar days after the date of the President’s veto.
(6) Effect of enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if a joint resolution of disapproval relating to a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) proposing an action described in subsection (a)(2) is enacted in accordance with subsection (c), the President may not take that action.
(c) Joint resolutions of disapproval or approval
(1) Definitions
In this subsection:
(A) Joint resolution of approval
The term joint resolution of approval means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—
(i)
the title of which is as follows: A joint resolution approving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to Russia.
; and
(ii)
the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: Congress approves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Russia proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under this section of the Ukraine Support Act with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.
.
(B) Joint resolution of disapproval
The term joint resolution of disapproval means only a joint resolution of either House of Congress—
(i)
the title of which is as follows: A joint resolution disapproving the President’s proposal to take an action relating to the application of certain sanctions with respect to Russia.
; and
(ii)
the sole matter after the resolving clause of which is the following: Congress disapproves of the action relating to the application of sanctions imposed with respect to Russia proposed by the President in the report submitted to Congress under this section of the Ukraine Support Act with the first blank space being filled with the appropriate date and the second blank space being filled with a short description of the proposed action.
.
(2) Introduction
During the period of 30 calendar days provided for under subsection (b)(1), including any additional period as applicable under the exception provided in subsection (b)(2), a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval may be introduced—
(A)
in the House of Representatives, by the majority leader or the minority leader; and
(B)
in the Senate, by the majority leader (or the majority leader’s designee) or the minority leader (or the minority leader’s designee).
(3) Floor consideration in house of representatives
If a committee of the House of Representatives to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.
(4) Consideration in the senate
(A) Committee referral
A joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval introduced in the Senate shall be—
(i)
referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate if the joint resolution relates to a report under subsection (a)(3)(A) that relates to an action that is not intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia; and
(ii)
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate if the joint resolution relates to a report under subsection (a)(3)(B) that relates to an action that is intended to significantly alter United States foreign policy with respect to Russia.
(B) Reporting and discharge
If the committee to which a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval was referred has not reported the joint resolution within 10 calendar days after the date of referral of the joint resolution, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution and the joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar.
(C) Proceeding to consideration
Notwithstanding Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, it is in order at any time after the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs or the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, reports a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval to the Senate or has been discharged from consideration of such a joint resolution (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution, and all points of order against the joint resolution (and against consideration of the joint resolution) are waived. The motion to proceed is not debatable. The motion is not subject to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
(D) Rulings of the chair on procedure
Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval shall be decided without debate.
(E) Consideration of veto messages
Debate in the Senate of any veto message with respect to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, including all debatable motions and appeals in connection with the joint resolution, shall be limited to 10 hours, to be equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.
(5) Rules relating to senate and house of representatives
(A) Treatment of senate joint resolution in house
In the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply to a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval received from the Senate (unless the House has already passed a joint resolution relating to the same proposed action):
(i)
The joint resolution shall be referred to the appropriate committees.
(ii)
If a committee to which a joint resolution has been referred has not reported the joint resolution within 2 calendar days after the date of referral, that committee shall be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution.
(iii)
Beginning on the third legislative day after each committee to which a joint resolution has been referred reports the joint resolution to the House or has been discharged from further consideration thereof, it shall be in order to move to proceed to consider the joint resolution in the House of Representatives. All points of order against the motion are waived. Such a motion shall not be in order after the House of Representatives has disposed of a motion to proceed on the joint resolution. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the motion to its adoption without intervening motion. The motion shall not be debatable. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is disposed of shall not be in order.
(iv)
The joint resolution shall be considered as read. All points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution to final passage without intervening motion except 2 hours of debate equally divided and controlled by the sponsor of the joint resolution (or a designee) and an opponent. A motion to reconsider the vote on passage of the joint resolution shall not be in order.
(B) Treatment of house joint resolution in senate
(i) Receipt before passage
If, before the passage by the Senate of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, the following procedures shall apply:
(I)
That joint resolution shall not be referred to a committee.
(II)
With respect to that joint resolution—
(aa)
the procedure in the Senate shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the House of Representatives; but
(bb)
the vote on passage shall be on the joint resolution from the House of Representatives.
(ii) Receipt after passage
If, following passage of a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval in the Senate, the Senate receives an identical joint resolution from the House of Representatives, that joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate Senate calendar.
(iii) No companion measure
If a joint resolution of approval or a joint resolution of disapproval is received from the House, and no companion joint resolution has been introduced in the Senate, the Senate procedures under this subsection shall apply to the House joint resolution.
(C) Application to revenue measures
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply in the House of Representatives to a joint resolution of approval or joint resolution of disapproval that is a revenue measure.
(d) Tolling
The requirements of this section may not be tolled by either the House of Representatives or the Senate.
Sec. 322. Definitions
In this title:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien
The terms admission, admitted, and alien have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Appropriate committees of congress
The term appropriate committees of Congress means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) Financial institution
The term financial institution means a financial institution specified in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (M), or (Y) of section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code.
(4) Foreign financial institution
The term foreign financial institution has the meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
(5) Foreign person
The term foreign person means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(6) Knowingly
The term knowingly with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means that a person had actual knowledge, or should have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.
(7) United states person
The term United States person means—
(A)
a United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States; or
(B)
an entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including a foreign branch of such an entity.
(8) War of aggression
The term war of aggression is implicated when any of the following have occurred in the 30 days prior to a sanctions trigger determination—
(A)
a ground, amphibious, or airborne assault;
(B)
any naval, aerial, or terrestrial blockade;
(C)
any drone or missile attack; and
(D)
any cyber attack that has any physical repercussion in the sovereign territory of Ukraine.