February 20, 2026
Mr. Lawler (for himself and Mr. Sherman) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
To support human rights and internet freedom in Iran and hold the Iranian regime accountable for the repression of the Iranian people.
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026
.
Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy
(a) Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
For nearly 5 decades, the people of Iran have endured brutal repression under the Islamic Republic, a regime that denies basic human rights, silences dissidents, and responds to peaceful protest with violence.
(2)
The people of Iran have courageously taking to the streets to demand economic opportunity, human rights, dignity, and freedom.
(3)
The Islamic Republic has responded to the ongoing protests with brutality by reportedly killing over 30,000 people and wounding thousands more, arresting approximate 40,000, and restricting internet access and telephone lines.
(4)
The people of Iran are in part protesting the Islamic regime’s economic mismanagement, corruption, internal suppression, and unjust executions.
(5)
Access to free expression, open information, and uncensored communication are fundamental human rights.
(6)
The inspiring 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests demanded an end to the Islamic Republic and its violence, including against Iranian women and ethnic minorities.
(7)
The barbaric so-called morality police and other arms of state suppression have a lengthy history of repressing the Iranian people’s fundamental freedoms, including the freedom to assemble, the freedom of religion, women’s rights, and LGBTQ rights.
(8)
The Islamic regime has engaged in systematic efforts to intimidate, harass, detain, and harm political dissidents, activists, and journalists both within Iran and beyond its borders.
(9)
The people of Iran deserve the right to dignity, democracy, and self-determination and to be free from the brutality of the Islamic Republic.
(b) Statement of policy
It shall be the policy of the United States to—
(1)
recognize the right of the Iranian people to freely determine, through free and fair elections, the nature of their political regime;
(2)
facilitate the immediate expansion of unrestricted internet access and civilian lines of communication across Iran;
(3)
fully enforce sanctions against regime human rights violators and their family members, including any family members and associates in the United States that continue to directly or indirectly provide support to the regime; and
(4)
work in coordination with its allies to consider and implement all necessary and appropriate measures to deter further lethal violence against protesters.
Sec. 3. Internet freedom and censorship circumvention
(a) Internet freedom report
(1) In general
Section 5124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22 U.S.C. 8754a) is amended—
(A)
in subsection (a)(2), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking subparagraph (A)
and inserting paragraph (1)
; and
(B)
by adding at the end of subsection (a)(2) the following new subparagraphs:
(H)
An assessment of the feasibility of using direct-to-cell wireless communications technologies to expand internet access for the people of Iran, including technical, regulatory, and security considerations.
(I)
An analysis of how drone-based platforms, signal jamming technologies, and related countermeasures could impact the feasibility, security, economics, and resilience of such direct-to-cell wireless communications.
(J)
A survey of terrestrial and non-terrestrial telecommunications service providers currently active in Iran, including—
(i)
whether such providers are State-owned or State-controlled;
(ii)
the extent of foreign participation or investment in such providers;
(iii)
the implications of such ownership and control for communications freedom and censorship; and
(iv)
any other relevant information to assess the opportunities and risks associated with terrestrial and non-terrestrial communications technologies in Iran.
(2) First update required
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of the Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of the Treasury, shall prepare and submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a periodic update described in paragraph (4) of section 5124(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22 U.S.C. 8754a) for the strategy required by that section, that includes the new matter added by the amendments made by paragraph (1) of this Act.
(b) Extension and increase of authorization for Iran Internet Freedom Grant Program
Section 5124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (Public Law 118–59), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended in subsection (b)(5)(A), by inserting and $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2030
after 2026
.
(c) Development of internet access technologies by the Defense Innovation Unit
(1) In general
The Defense Innovation Unit (referred to in this section as the Unit
) shall support the development of low-cost, easily scalable, and rapidly deployable technologies to counter internet shutdowns or limitations on network in Iran to enable the Iranian population to overcome such restrictions.
(2) Objectives
In carrying out paragraph (1), the Unit shall prioritize the following objectives:
(A)
Identifying and supporting the development of technologies capable of overcoming internet blackouts and network disruptions imposed by Iran and facilitating internet and network access, including—
(i)
low-Earth orbit satellite internet infrastructure;
(ii)
mesh networking solutions; and
(iii)
portable and deployable communication systems.
(B)
Virtual private networks.
(C)
Collaborating with industry, academia, and relevant stakeholders to accelerate the research, development, and deployment of such technologies.
(D)
Conducting pilot programs and field experiments to test the effectiveness and scalability of technologies the development of which the Unit supported under this subsection in real-world settings.
(E)
Providing technical assistance and resources to partner organizations, governments, and non-governmental entities engaged in efforts to expand internet access.
(F)
Identifying and evaluating commercially available off-the-shelf items (as defined in section 104 of title 41, United States Code) that could be rapidly procured and deployed to address internet access challenges in targeted regions.
(3) Collaboration with Defense Acquisition University
The Unit shall collaborate with the Defense Acquisition University regarding the acquisition processes and practices related to carrying out the objectives under paragraph (2) for the purposes of—
(A)
integrating best practices in defense acquisition into the research, development, and deployment processes of technologies the development of which the Unit supports under this subsection to facilitate internet access;
(B)
ensuring that technologies the development of which the Unit supports under this subsection align with the priorities and strategies of the Department of Defense for acquisition;
(C)
providing training and educational opportunities for Unit personnel on acquisition principles, regulations, and procedures, with a focus on technology development for countering censorship and related restrictions;
(D)
fostering dialogue and the exchange of knowledge between acquisition professionals and innovation specialists to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the acquisition of defense technology related to internet access technologies; and
(E)
the Unit and the Defense Acquisition University collaborating on the development of acquisition strategies that prioritize the rapid acquisition and deployment of technologies aimed at countering censorship and restrictions on accessing the internet.
(4) Reporting
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the Director of the Unit shall submit to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code) a report detailing the progress, challenges, and outcomes of the efforts undertaken pursuant to this subsection.
(5) Funding
There is authorized to be appropriated $2,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2030 to carry out the activities described in this subsection.
Sec. 4. Stop corrupt Iranian oligarchs and entities
(a) Report
(1) In general
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a detailed report on the following:
(A)
Senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in Iran, including the following:
(i)
An identification of the most significant senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in Iran, as determined by the closeness to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran of each such figure and oligarch, and the estimated net worth of each such figure and oligarch.
(ii)
An assessment of the relationship between the individuals identified under clause (i) and President Masoud Pezeshkian or other members of the ruling elite of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
(iii)
An identification of any indices of corruption with respect to such individuals.
(iv)
Known sources of income of such individuals and their family members (including spouses, children, parents, and siblings), including relevant beneficial ownership information.
(v)
An identification of the non-Iranian business affiliations of such individuals.
(B)
Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities, including an assessment of the following:
(i)
The emergence of Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities and their role in the economy of Iran.
(ii)
The leadership structures and beneficial ownership of such entities.
(iii)
An identification of the non-Iranian business affiliations of such entities.
(C)
Information relating to the exposure of key economic sectors of the United States, including, at minimum, the banking, securities, insurance, and real estate sectors, to Islamic Republic of Iran politically affiliated persons, Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities, and other Islamic Republic of Iran state-owned enterprises.
(D)
Information relating to the likely effects of imposing debt and equity restrictions on Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities, as well as the anticipated effects of adding Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities to the list of Specially Designated Nationals maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury.
(E)
Information relating to the potential impacts of imposing sanctions or debt and equity restrictions in addition to any such sanctions or restrictions in existence as of the date of the enactment of this Act on Islamic Republic of Iran oligarchs, Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities, or Islamic Republic of Iran state-owned enterprises, including impacts on such oligarchs, entities, and enterprises and on the economy of Iran, as well as on the economies of the United States and United States allies.
(2) Form
The report required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and may contain a classified annex.
(3) Definitions
In this subsection:
(A) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(i)
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; and
(ii)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Finance of the Senate.
(B) Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities
The term Islamic Republic of Iran parastatal entities means entities—
(i)
in which the ownership interest of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is at least 25 percent; and
(ii)
that had 2024 revenues of approximately $2,000,000,000 or more.
(C) Senior foreign political figure
The term senior foreign political figure has the meaning given such term in section 1010.605 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (or any corresponding similar regulation or ruling).
(b) Iran kleptocracy initiative
Section 310 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
(m) Iran kleptocracy initiative
(1) Establishment
There is established within FinCEN the Iran Kleptocracy Initiative (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the
Initiative), to investigate, expose, disrupt, and prosecute corruption, money laundering, and racketeering activities by Islamic Republic of Iran government officials, their family members, associates, and proxies.(2) Director
The Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint a Director to serve as the head of the Initiative.
(3) Responsibilities
The Initiative shall—
(A)
identify, trace, and catalog assets (including real property, financial accounts, luxury goods, and investments) held by or attributable to Islamic Republic of Iran government officials and their proxies, including those concealed through nominees, shell companies, family members, or third-country intermediaries;
(B)
coordinate with the Department of State, and allied governments to freeze, forfeit, seize, and, where appropriate and legally permissible, repurpose illicitly acquired assets for the benefit of the Iranian people or victims of corruption;
(C)
develop and publish unclassified findings, reports, and public designations regarding corrupt practices within the Islamic Republic of Iran regime, including case studies of asset concealment and sanctions evasion (consistent with national security and operational requirements);
(D)
coordinate with Federal, State, and international law enforcement agencies, including through joint task forces, to facilitate civil and criminal prosecutions, asset recoveries, and extraditions under applicable United States laws, including chapters 46, 95, and 96 of title 18 and sanctions statutes; and
(E)
establish protocols for rewarding credible information leading to successful investigations, asset forfeitures, or prosecutions, in coordination with existing rewards programs.
(4) Interagency coordination
(A) Director
The Director shall serve as the primary point of contact for coordination with relevant Federal agencies and the heads of appropriate Federal law enforcement agencies and international partners.
(B) Interagency meetings
The Director shall convene regular interagency meetings and share non-classified threat intelligence on Islamic Republic of Iran kleptocracy networks.
(5) Report
(A) In general
Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the activities of the Initiative.
(B) Elements
Each report required by subparagraph (A) shall include—
(i)
a summary of investigations initiated, ongoing, and concluded, including the number of indictments, convictions, and asset forfeitures attributable to the Initiative;
(ii)
an accounting of assets identified, frozen, seized, or repatriated, including estimated values;
(iii)
challenges encountered and recommendations for legislative or administrative improvements; and
(iv)
metrics on international cooperation and public impact.
(C) Form
Each report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(6) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this subsection, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(B)
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(7) Rule of construction
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit the authority of any Federal agency to investigate or prosecute corruption or racketeering activities under other provisions of law.
Sec. 5. Congressional nomination authority
(a) In general
Not later than 120 days after receiving a written request from the chairman or ranking minority member of any of the appropriate congressional committees regarding whether a foreign person has engaged in the conduct described in subsection (b), the President shall—
(1)
determine whether the foreign person has engaged in such conduct; and
(2)
submit to such chairman or ranking minority member a written justification detailing whether the President has imposed, or intends to impose, sanctions pursuant to the regulations described in subsection (b)(2) with respect to such person.
(b) Conduct described
The conduct described in this subsection is knowingly providing material support for the Islamic Republic of Iran regime’s human rights abuses, censorship, or repression of the Iranian people, including—
(1)
selling, supplying, or transferring censorship technology, surveillance tools, or internet shutdown capabilities; or
(2)
any conduct sanctionable under part 562 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations (relating to Iranian Human Rights Abuses Sanctions Regulations).
(c) Appropriate congressional committees defined
In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees means—
(1)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and
(2)
the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
Sec. 6. Sense of Congress on Iran broadcasting and human rights assistance
It is the sense of Congress that United States policy should—
(1)
promote and provide United States Government and international broadcasting efforts targeted at providing the people of Iran with truthful reporting to counter Islamic Republic of Iran regime censorship;
(2)
support independent Iranian journalists, media outlets, and citizen journalists, including grants for equipment, training, secure communication platforms, relocation assistance for those at risk, and capacity-building for Persian-language media;
(3)
coordinate mechanisms with international partners, the private sector, and diaspora communities to amplify credible independent media; and
(4)
produce annual performance metrics and benchmarks for audience reach, content impact, and program outcomes.