April 2, 2026
Mr. Lawler (for himself, Mr. Min, and Mr. Stanton) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan’s national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative Act
.
Sec. 2. Findings
Congress finds the following:
(1)
The Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.
(2)
Undersea cables and other critical undersea infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Taiwan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infrastructure would significantly impact the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and internationally, leading to a breakdown in military, economic, and social functions.
(3)
The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan's critical infrastructure.
(4)
The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's military and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt to force unification with the PRC.
(5)
Recent activities by foreign adversaries, particularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure serving Taiwan and other nations, including—
(A)
in February 2023, two vessels registered to the PRC severed two undersea cables that effectively cut internet access to the 13,000 residents of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, who had to rely on microwave radio transmissions to provide limited internet access for 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete repairs;
(B)
in January 2025, Taiwan’s Chunghwa Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable north of Taipei and identified a suspicious vessel
registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pattern while dragging its anchor near where the cable was damaged;
(C)
in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by Taiwan’s coast guard after suspicious movements off the coast of New Taipei; and
(D)
in February 2025, Taiwan’s coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan’s Penghu Islands after an undersea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship’s anchor in the area and that he might have broken the cable
.
(6)
Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian involvement and possible coordination in several incidents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators accountable.
(7)
The sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure constitutes gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and undermine international security while falling short of direct military confrontation.
(8)
Several regional mechanisms have been established to bolster the security of undersea cables, including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhancing the security and resilience of undersea cables in the Indo-Pacific.
(9)
Taiwan is the world’s 21st largest economy by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in the global information and communications technology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet connectivity or energy security would have a direct impact on the world’s economy.
(10)
To counter the threats described in this section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is imperative for the United States and its allies to take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical undersea infrastructure and foster international cooperation to protect those critical assets.
Sec. 3. Definitions
In this section:
(1) Critical undersea infrastructure
The term critical undersea infrastructure means—
(A)
subsea energy infrastructure, including a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, to transmit electricity (including via subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or equipment related to the support of offshore energy production installations) or to transport natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated landing stations and facilities; or
(B)
subsea telecommunications infrastructure, including subsea fiber-optic cables and related equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed, and used to transmit communications, data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated landing stations and facilities.
(2) Sabotage
The term sabotage means actions, or preparations for future actions, taken with the intent to cause defective production of, operation of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, including the integrity of data transmitted via subsea telecommunications infrastructure.
Sec. 4. Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Resilience Initiative
(a) Establishment
Not later than 360 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to be known as the Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure Initiative
(in this section referred to as the Initiative
).
(b) Priority
The Initiative shall prioritize the protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the PRC.
(c) Key focus areas
(1) Advanced monitoring and detection capabilities
In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan’s critical undersea infrastructure from global intelligence networks.
(2) Rapid response protocols
(A) In general
In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall—
(i)
in cooperation with regional partners, establish rapid response protocols for damaged critical undersea infrastructure or mitigating disruptions; and
(ii)
work with allies and partners of the United States to help Taiwan and regional partners develop the logistical capacity to respond quickly to attacks on critical undersea infrastructure and minimize downtime.
(B) Authorization of appropriations
There is authorized to be appropriated $20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A).
(3) Enhancing maritime domain awareness
In carrying out the Initiative—
(A)
the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional partners, shall enhance maritime domain awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activities near critical undersea infrastructure; and
(B)
the Commandant of the Coast Guard shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding maritime zones, to monitor potential threats and prevent sabotage.
(4) International frameworks for protection
(A) In general
In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to establish cooperative frameworks with regional and global partners to protect undersea cable networks near Taiwan.
(B) Elements
The frameworks established under subparagraph (A) shall provide for participation by the United States in joint drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and collaborative surveillance operations to enhance collective security against sabotage.
(5) Taiwan-specific cable hardening
In carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall encourage and support the hardening of critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including reinforcing cables, improving burial depths, and using more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and sabotage.
Sec. 5. Countering PRC gray zone tactics
(a) Working with partners To counter PRC sabotage
The President shall work with like-minded international partners to implement strategies that directly counter the Government of the PRC's critical undersea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.
(b) Raising awareness
The President shall work with like-minded international partners to raise global awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, including through public diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in international forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.
Sec. 6. Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage
(a) In general
The President, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to any foreign person that the President determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, including—
(1)
any foreign vessel or entity the owner or operator of which knowingly—
(A)
commits acts of sabotage; or
(B)
conducts preparatory surveillance, logistical support, security, or other services that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and
(2)
any foreign person that knowingly—
(A)
owns, operates, or manages a vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);
(B)
provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;
(C)
facilitates deceptive or structured transactions to support such a vessel or entity;
(D)
provides port or logistics services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions;
(E)
provides documentation, registration, or flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanctions; or
(F)
serves as a captain, principal officer, or senior leader of such a vessel or entity.
(b) Report required
Not later than 15 days after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that includes a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions.
(c) Sanctions described
The sanctions described in this subsection are the following:
(1) Blocking of property
The President shall exercise all of the powers granted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of a foreign person described in subsection (a), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person.
(2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole
(A) Visas, admission, or parole
An alien described in subsection (a) shall be—
(i)
inadmissible to the United States;
(ii)
ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and
(iii)
otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).
(B) Current visas revoked
(i) In general
The visa or other entry documentation of an alien described in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless of when such visa or other entry documentation is or was issued.
(ii) Immediate effect
A revocation under clause (i) shall—
(I)
take effect immediately; and
(II)
automatically cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien.
(d) Implementation; penalties
(1) Implementation
The President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 203 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this section.
(2) Penalties
A person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulation, license, or order issued to carry out this section shall be subject to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of that section.
(e) Exceptions
(1) Exception to comply with United Nations Headquarters Agreement and law enforcement activities
Sanctions under this section shall not apply with respect to the admission or parole of an alien into the United States if admitting or paroling the alien is necessary—
(A)
to permit the United States to comply with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947, between the United Nations and the United States, or other applicable international obligations of the United States; or
(B)
to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.
(2) Exception to comply with intelligence activities
Sanctions under this section shall not apply to any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intelligence activities of the United States.
(3) Exception relating to importation of goods
(A) In general
A requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.
(B) Good defined
In this paragraph, the term good means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data.
(f) National security interests waiver
The President may waive the application of sanctions under this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President submits to the appropriate congressional committees—
(1)
a certification in writing that the issuance of the waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and
(2)
a report explaining the basis for the certification.
(g) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Admission; admitted; alien; etc
The terms admission, admitted, alien, and lawfully admitted for permanent residence have the meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).
(2) Appropriate congressional committees
The term appropriate congressional committees means—
(A)
the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and
(B)
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
(3) Foreign person
The term foreign person means an individual or entity that is not a United States person.
(4) United states person
The term United States person means—
(A)
any United States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the United States;
(B)
an entity organized under the laws of the United States or of any jurisdiction within the United States, including any foreign branch of such an entity; or
(C)
any person in the United States.
Sec. 7. Semiannual report
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing—
(1)
any incidents of interference or sabotage related to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan; and
(2)
any actions taken in response to such incidents.
Sec. 8. Interagency contingency planning for cross-Strait crisis
(a) Statement of policy
It is the policy of the United States to be prepared for potential crises involving Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through comprehensive interagency contingency planning that addresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the national security of the United States.
(b) Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group
(1) In general
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group—
(A)
to be chaired by the National Security Council; and
(B)
consisting of senior officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the United States intelligence community, and such other Federal agencies as may be appropriate.
(2) Functions
The Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall—
(A)
conduct scenario-based planning exercises to prepare for potential crises involving Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine scenarios, the seizure of an outlying island, military contingencies, economic coercion, cyber attacks, and hybrid threats;
(B)
identify critical vulnerabilities in supply chains, financial systems, critical infrastructure, and security posture of the United States and allies and partners of the United States that would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan;
(C)
develop integrated contingency plans that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic, cyber, and homeland security responses across the Group;
(D)
assess the adequacy of existing authorities, resources, and decision-making processes to execute such contingency plans;
(E)
identify gaps in capabilities, authorities, or coordination mechanisms and recommend solutions;
(F)
share risk assessments with allies and partners of the United States, as appropriate; and
(G)
regularly test and refine contingency plans.
(3) Report required
Not later than 180 days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Congress a classified report that includes—
(A)
a description of contingency scenarios assessed and planning activities conducted by the Group;
(B)
an assessment of the preparedness of the United States and allies and partners of the United States to respond to a crisis involving Taiwan, including identification of capability gaps and resource requirements;
(C)
recommendations for legislative action, policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance such preparedness; and
(D)
a description of exercises conducted and lessons learned by the Group.