(1)

The right to vote by casting a ballot for one’s preferred candidate is a fundamental right accorded to United States citizens by the Constitution, and the unimpeded exercise of this right is essential to the functioning of our democracy.

(2)

Historically, certain citizens, especially racial, ethnic, and language minorities, were prevented from voting because of significant barriers such as literacy tests, poll taxes, and property ownership requirements.

(3)

Some of these barriers were removed by the 15th, 19th, and 24th Amendments to the Constitution.

(4)

Despite the elimination of some of these barriers to the polls, the integrity of today’s elections is threatened by newer tactics aimed at suppressing voter turnout. These tactics include deceptive practices, which involve the dissemination of false or misleading information intended to prevent voters from casting their ballots, prevent voters from voting for the candidate of their choice, intimidate the electorate, and undermine the integrity of the electoral process.

(5)

Furthermore, since the decision in Shelby County v. Holder in which the Supreme Court struck down the coverage formula used by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to determine which States with a history of racial discrimination must affirmatively receive government permission before changing local voting laws, there have been Federal court decisions finding or affirming that States or localities intentionally discriminated against African Americans and other voters of color.

(6)

Denials of the right to vote, and deceptive practices designed to prevent members of racial, ethnic, and language minorities from exercising that right, are an outgrowth of discriminatory history, including slavery. Measures to combat denials of that right are a legitimate exercise of congressional power under article I, section 4 and article II, section 1 of, and the 14th and 15th Amendments to, the United States Constitution.

(7)

For the last few decades, there have been a number of instances of deceptive or intimidating practices aimed towards suppressing minority access to the voting booth that demonstrates the need for strengthened protections.

(8)

In addition, in at least one instance in 1990, thousands of voters reportedly received postcards providing false information about voter eligibility and warnings about criminal penalties for voter fraud. Most of the voters who received the postcards were African American.

(9)

During the 2004 elections, Native American voters in South Dakota reported being required to provide photographic identification in order to vote, despite the fact that neither State nor Federal law required such identification.

(10)

In the 2006 midterm elections, thousands of Latino voters received mailings warning them in Spanish that voting in a Federal election as an immigrant could result in incarceration—despite the fact that any immigrant who is a naturalized citizen of the United States has the same right to vote as any other citizen.

(11)

In 2008, fliers were distributed in predominantly African American neighborhoods falsely warning that people with outstanding warrants or unpaid parking tickets could be arrested if they showed up at the polls on election day. In the same year, there were reports of people receiving text messages on election day asking them to wait until the following day to vote.

(12)

In 2012, there were reports of voters receiving calls falsely informing them that they could vote via telephone.

(13)

On January 6, 2017, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published a report titled Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections, noting that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. Presidential election.. Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operation—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, State-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or trolls. These influence operations included messaging that targeted African American voters with misinformation.

(14)

On April 18, 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller released a report titled Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, which concluded that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion.. The report details that Russia interfered in the 2016 Presidential election principally through two operations: first, through a Russian government sponsored social media influence campaign, and second, by Russian intelligence computer-intrusion operations against those associated with both Presidential campaigns. The Mueller Report details how Russian agents intentionally targeted Black social justice groups and created fake accounts purporting to represent Black social justice groups in order to spread disinformation and sow division.

(15)

Social media makes the mass dissemination of misleading information easy and allows perpetrators to target particular audiences with precision. One analysis documented hundreds of messages on Facebook and Twitter designed to discourage or prevent people from voting in the 2018 election. In 2016, these false statements were extremely prevalent with both domestic and foreign actors. Russian operatives engaged in a concerted disinformation and propaganda campaign over the internet that aimed, in part, to suppress voter turnout, especially among Black voters. These efforts by the Russian Government continued and became more aggressive in the 2020 election cycle.

(16)

In 2023, Douglass Mackey was convicted for his role in the conspiracy to interfere with potential voters’ right to vote in the 2016 Presidential election, in violation of section 241 of title 18, United States Code. The Department of Justice alleged that Mackey conspired with other influential Twitter users and with members of private online groups to use social media platforms, including Twitter, to disseminate fraudulent messages that encouraged supporters of Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton to vote via text message or social media. However, in 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Mackey's conviction on the ground that prosecutors had not proven that his deceptive conduct was part of a conspiracy. This ruling underscores the need for Congress to update the law to more effectively protect against voter suppression through deceptive practices, regardless of whether it is accomplished through a conspiracy or by one bad actor alone.

(17)

During the 2020 Presidential election, Texas voters received robocalls stating that the Democratic primary would be taking place after its actual date. In the same year, communities of color in Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and New York were targeted by robocalls sharing false information about how their data would be shared if they voted by mail. Widespread disinformation was targeted at Latino communities in Florida and other States, particularly through social media.

(18)

During the 2020 Presidential election, voters in some precincts faced voter intimidation during early voting and on election day. The Election Protection hotline received nearly 32,000 calls on election day. Reports from the Voting Rights Defender and Prepared to Vote project teams and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., showed that minority voters were disproportionately impacted by voter intimidation. Incidents included 3,000,000 robocalls telling people to stay home on election day and armed people at polling sites on election day in Florida, North Carolina, and Louisiana. Additionally, election officials, volunteers, and electors faced unprecedented intimidation including doxxing, death threats, and other intimidating communication.

(19)

Those responsible for these and similar efforts should be held accountable, and civil and criminal penalties should be available to punish anyone who seeks to keep voters away from the polls by providing false information.

(20)

Moreover, the Federal Government should help correct such false information in order to assist voters in exercising their right to vote without confusion and to preserve the integrity of the electoral process.

(21)

The Federal Government has a compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and undue influence and in preserving the integrity of its election process. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992).

(22)

The First Amendment does not preclude the regulation of some intentionally false speech, even if it is political in nature. As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, [t]hat speech is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution. For the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social, or political change is to be effected. … Hence the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).

(a) Prohibition

Subsection (b) of section 2004 of the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)) is amended—

(b) Private right of action

(c) Criminal penalties

(a) Corrective action

(b) Written procedures and standards for taking corrective action

(c) Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Attorney General such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subtitle.

(a) In general

Not later than 180 days after each general election for Federal office, the Attorney General shall submit to Congress a report compiling all allegations received by the Attorney General of deceptive practices described in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 2004(b) of the Revised Statutes (52 U.S.C. 10101(b)), as added by section 3(a), relating to the general election for Federal office and any primary, runoff, or a special election for Federal office held in the 2 years preceding the general election.

(b) Contents

(c) Report made public

On the date that the Attorney General submits the report under subsection (a), the Attorney General shall also make the report publicly available through the internet and other appropriate means.

(1)

by striking Any person and inserting the following:

(A) In general

Any person; and

(2)

by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

(B) Intimidation, etc

(i) In general

A person aggrieved by a violation of subsection (b)(1) shall include, without limitation, an officer responsible for maintaining order and preventing intimidation, threats, or coercion in or around a location at which voters may cast their votes.

(ii) Corrective action

If the Attorney General receives a credible report that conduct that violates or would be reasonably likely to violate subsection (b)(1) has occurred or is likely to occur, and if the Attorney General determines that State and local officials have not taken adequate steps to promptly communicate that such conduct would violate subsection (b)(1) or applicable State or local laws, the Attorney General shall communicate to the public, by any means, including by means of written, electronic, or telephonic communications, accurate information designed to convey the unlawfulness of proscribed conduct under subsection (b)(1) and the responsibilities of and resources available to State and local officials to prevent or correct such violations.

(1)

in subparagraph (B), by striking or at the end; and

(2)

by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

(D)

processing or scanning ballots, or tabulating, canvassing, or certifying voting results; or