June 4, 2026
Mr. Kelly introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services
To establish requirements for human judgment in the use of force by autonomous weapon systems used by the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the Ultimate Human Responsibility in Defense Systems Act of 2026
.
Sec. 2. Definitions
In this Act:
(1) Autonomous weapon system
The term autonomous weapon system means a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.
(2) Congressional defense committees
The term congressional defense committees has the meaning given that term in section 101(a) of title 10, United States Code.
(3) Ultimate human responsibility
The term ultimate human responsibility, with respect to a weapon system, means the ability of a human commander or operator to exercise informed human agency—
(A)
to understand the operational context of the weapon system through training, capacity building, and integration of design and testing features that strengthen human understanding and effective oversight;
(B)
to supervise, intervene in, or terminate the use of force by the system, thereby guaranteeing human responsibility when appropriate given system design; and
(C)
to ensure compliance with all applicable United States law and international law, including applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, the law of armed conflict, and rules of engagement.
(4) Use of force
The term use of force means the application of kinetic lethal or non-lethal military force against a target.
Sec. 3. Requirement for human judgment in autonomous weapon systems
(a) Policy requirement
The Secretary of Defense shall—
(1)
ensure that any autonomous weapon system or artificial intelligence capability developed, acquired, or operated by the Department of Defense—
(A)
is designed and employed in a manner that enables commanders and operators to exercise ultimate human responsibility over the use of force; and
(B)
is developed, fielded and employed using ethical and legal principles that would delineate unlawful uses of artificial intelligence; and
(2)
develop technical and operational and organizational guidelines around the use of artificial intelligence.
(b) Design requirements
To meet the requirements under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that any autonomous weapon system or artificial intelligence capability described in such subsection, to the maximum extent practicable—
(1)
allows human operators to supervise the operation of the weapon system during mission execution when appropriate given system design;
(2)
includes mechanisms that allow commanders or operators to intervene in or terminate the use of force by the weapon system during mission execution when appropriate given system design;
(3)
includes fail-safe mechanisms to enable manual control when autonomous systems are degraded, jammed, spoofed, or under adversarial attack when appropriate given system design;
(4)
provides sufficient information regarding weapon system status and decision logic to enable operators to understand, oversee, and exercise functional control over system behavior;
(5)
maintains records of relevant target selection data, decision logic, and human operator actions sufficient to enable post-engagement review of compliance with the requirements under subsection (a); and
(6)
operates consistent with applicable United States law and international law, rules of engagement, the law of armed conflict, applicable treaties, and Department of Defense policy.
(c) Operational oversight
(1) In general
The Secretary of Defense shall establish procedures to ensure that commanders and operators are rigorously trained to appropriately supervise autonomous weapon systems or artificial intelligence capabilities in operational environments, including regular proficiency assessments in manual target identification, threat assessment, and engagement procedures, to ensure operators can effectively execute missions using other capabilities when autonomous systems are unavailable or unreliable.
(2) Reporting mechanism
The procedures established under paragraph (1) shall include a mechanism for operators of autonomous weapon systems or artificial intelligence capability to report, without fear of reprisal, concerns regarding weapon system reliability or the adequacy of human-machine interfaces.
Sec. 4. Review and certification
(a) Senior-Level review
(1) In general
Before fielding an autonomous weapon system capable of independently selecting and engaging targets without human supervision, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation shall conduct a review to certify that the weapon system complies with the requirements of this Act.
(2) Independent assessment
Each review required under paragraph (1) with respect to an autonomous weapon system shall include an independent adversarial testing (red-team
) assessment that evaluates the vulnerability of the system to adversarial manipulation under operationally realistic conditions, including degraded and electronic warfare contested environments (such as jamming and spoofing), communication disruption, and adversarial manipulation.
(b) Certification requirement
No autonomous weapon system described in subsection (a) may be fielded by the Department of Defense unless the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation certifies that the weapon system—
(1)
allows for ultimate human responsibility with respect to the use of force; and
(2)
has been tested to verify secure, safe, and reliable operations that meet the reliability standards of the Department for weapon systems, including retesting following any significant software update or change in operational environment.
(c) Testing standards
(1) In general
Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation shall publish on a publicly available website standards for the testing and evaluation of artificial intelligence components in autonomous weapon systems, including benchmarks for reliability, robustness, security, and human-machine team performance.
(2) Form
The standards required to be published under paragraph (1) shall be published in unclassified form to the maximum extent practicable.
Sec. 5. Annual reporting to Congress
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semiannually thereafter until the date that is six years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes—
(1)
a summary of autonomous weapon systems in development or fielded by the Department of Defense;
(2)
steps taken by the Secretary to ensure compliance with the requirements of this Act; and
(3)
such recommendations as the Secretary may have for legislative or administrative action relating to human judgment in autonomous weapon systems.
Sec. 6. Autonomous weapon system incident repository
(a) Establishment
The Secretary of Defense shall establish and maintain a centralized repository for reporting, collecting, and analyzing incidents involving autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities used by the Department of Defense.
(b) Purpose
The repository established under subsection (a) shall be used—
(1)
to document operational incidents, weapon system failures, unintended weapon system behaviors, or near-miss events involving autonomous weapon systems and artificial incident capabilities;
(2)
to enable the Department to identify systemic risks, software errors, or operational vulnerabilities associated with such weapon systems and capabilities; and
(3)
to promote institutional learning and improvement in the design, testing, and operational employment of autonomous weapon systems and artificial intelligence capabilities.
(c) Reporting requirements
The Secretary shall establish procedures requiring the reporting of incidents described in subsection (b)(1), including—
(1)
operational malfunctions affecting the use of force;
(2)
unintended or anomalous weapon system behavior;
(3)
instances in which autonomous weapon systems or artificial intelligence capabilities selected or engaged targets inconsistent with commander intent or rules of engagement, regardless of whether engagement was ultimately executed;
(4)
human-machine interaction failures affecting command or operator control; and
(5)
other safety-related events determined appropriate by the Secretary.
(d) Safety reporting model
In establishing the repository under subsection (a), the Secretary shall, to the extent practicable, model reporting practices on aviation safety reporting systems used to identify and mitigate systemic risks in complex operational environments.
(e) Analysis and dissemination
The Secretary shall ensure that information collected through the repository established under subsection (a) is analyzed to identify trends and lessons learned, and that appropriate findings are disseminated across the Department of Defense to improve system design, training, and operational procedures.
(f) Protection of sensitive information
Information contained in the repository established under subsection (a) shall be handled in accordance with applicable classification, operational security, and national security requirements.
(g) Congressional briefing
Not less frequently than semiannually, the Secretary shall provide to the congressional defense committees a classified briefing on trends, systemic risks, and corrective actions identified through the repository established under subsection (a).
Sec. 7. Training pipelines
(a) In general
The Secretary of Defense shall develop formal training pipelines for autonomous systems of the Department of Defense.
(b) Elements
The formal training pipelines developed under subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1)
Specialized training tracks for operators, commanders, and system supervisors.
(2)
Certification in human-machine teaming, not just system operation.
(3)
Mandatory training in denied and contested environments, such as loss of global positioning system, electronic warfare, and degraded communications.
(4)
Integration of autonomous systems into Combat Training Center rotations.
(5)
Continuous retraining tied to software updates and system changes.
Sec. 8. Civilian harm mitigation and response office
(a) Establishment
The Secretary of Defense shall establish within the Office of the Secretary of Defense an office to be known as the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Office
(in this section referred to as the Office
).
(b) Purpose
The purpose of the Office is to develop, oversee, and coordinate Department-wide policies, practices, and capabilities to prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm resulting from military operations.
(c) Responsibilities
The Office shall—
(1)
develop and implement policies and guidance relating to civilian harm mitigation and response;
(2)
oversee the integration of civilian harm mitigation practices into planning, targeting, and operational processes;
(3)
coordinate assessments, investigations, and responses to incidents involving civilian harm;
(4)
support training and doctrine development across the Department; and
(5)
provide regular reports to Congress on civilian harm mitigation efforts and outcomes.
(d) Leadership
The Office shall be headed by a senior official designated by the Secretary of Defense.
Sec. 9. Rule of construction
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prohibit the development or use of autonomous weapon systems designed to intercept incoming threats where human supervision remains part of the operational design.