June 26 (legislative day, June 24), 2025
Mr. Cornyn (for himself, Mr. Wicker, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Crapo, Mr. Mullin, Mr. Ricketts, Mrs. Britt, Mr. McCormick, Mr. Graham, Mr. Scott of Florida, Mr. Justice, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Budd, Mrs. Fischer, and Mr. Cruz) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
Expressing the sense of the Senate in support of the recent United States and Israeli military strikes on Iran.
Whereas, in August 2002, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s secret nuclear program was revealed, including the existence of a fuel enrichment plant in Natanz, Iran, and the heavy-water plant in Arak, Iran;
Whereas, on April 11, 2006, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that it had enriched uranium for the first time to a level close to 3.5 percent at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas, in 2018, during a raid on a warehouse in Tehran’s Turquzabad district, Israel’s Mossad seized a vast nuclear archive of approximately 100,000 documents (commonly known as Iran's Atomic Archive
), which revealed Iran’s AMAD Plan, a structured nuclear weapons program aimed at producing 5 nuclear warheads, including detailed designs, high-explosive tests, detonator development, and integration of a warhead into the Shahab-3 ballistic missile;
Whereas, on May 31, 2021, it was reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to provide any explanation for the uranium remnants found at undeclared sites in Iran, and such an explanation had not been provided as of the date of the enactment of this resolution;
Whereas, on May 30, 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (referred to in this preamble as the IAEA
) reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had achieved a stockpile of 43.3 kilograms (95.5 pounds) of 60 percent highly enriched uranium, which is roughly enough material to construct a nuclear weapon;
Whereas, on February 27, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had enriched uranium to 83.7 percent, which is just short of the 90 percent threshold for weapons-grade fissile material;
Whereas, on September 16, 2023, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran banned the activities of nearly one-third of the IAEA’s most experienced nuclear inspectors in Iran, a decision that, according to IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, harmed the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear program;
Whereas, on December 28, 2023, the Governments of the United States, of France, of Germany, and of the United Kingdom jointly declared, The production of high-enriched uranium by Iran has no credible civilian justification
;
Whereas, on July 23, 2024, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence published an assessment, in accordance with the Iran Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8701 note; section 5593 of Public Law 117–263), stating that the Islamic Republic of Iran has undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so
;
Whereas, on November 15, 2024, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran has continued to expand its enrichment facilities and install additional advanced centrifuges, including at the Natanz Nuclear Facility, where there are 15 cascades of advanced centrifuges, and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, where there are advanced preparations for the expansion of the facility;
Whereas, on February 26, 2025, the IAEA reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran has between 5 and 7 metric tons of enriched uranium and had increased its total stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 274.8 kilograms (605.83 pounds), which, if further enriched, could be sufficient to produce 6 nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on May 31, 2025, the IAEA released a comprehensive report detailing Iran’s noncompliance with its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons safeguards obligations, noting that Iran—
(1)
increased its stockpile of 60 percent highly enriched uranium to 408.6 kilograms as of May 17, 2025, which constitutes a 50 percent increase compared to its February 2025 report, a stockpile sufficient for approximately 9 nuclear weapons (if further enriched);
(2)
conducted undeclared nuclear activities at 4 sites—Lavisan-Shian, Varamin, Marivan, and Turquzabad—involving nuclear material and equipment; and
(3)
provided inaccurate or contradictory explanations, which severely obstructed IAEA verification efforts and raises serious concerns about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program;
Whereas, on April 7, 2025, President Donald Trump stated, You know, it’s not a complicated formula. Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon. That’s all there is.
;
Whereas, on April 8, 2025, a senior official of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected the dismantlement of its nuclear program by stating, Trump wants a new deal: end Iran’s regional influence, dismantle its nuclear program, and halt its missile work. These are unacceptable to Tehran. Our nuclear program cannot be dismantled.
;
Whereas, on April 15, 2025, in an ultimatum issued to the Islamic Republic of Iran, President Trump—
(1)
demanded that a new nuclear deal be signed within 60 days to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program; and
(2)
warned that failure to comply with this demand would result in military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons;
Whereas, on April 16, 2025, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected United States demands and asserted its right to maintain its nuclear program and missile capabilities, escalating tensions and setting the stage for subsequent military operations by Israel and the United States;
Whereas, on June 13, 2025, Israel began Operation Rising Lion with strikes against the Iranian nuclear program, key Iranian military leaders, and other strategic targets;
Whereas, on June 21, 2025, the United States launched Operation Midnight Hammer, conducting targeted strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, which significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear program;
Whereas Iran has developed advanced ballistic missile systems, including the Shahab-3, Ghadr, and Khorramshahr missiles, with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers and payloads capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which poses a significant threat as delivery systems for nuclear weapons to targets in the Middle East and parts of Europe; and
Whereas Iran, currently the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of United States citizens, including more than 600 United States servicemembers in Iraq through Iranian-backed militias, and other terrorist activities: Now, therefore, be it
That the Senate—
(1)
supports the United States’ decisive military strikes under Operation Midnight Hammer to degrade Iran’s nuclear program;
(2)
affirms that the Islamic Republic of Iran must never be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, which would threaten the security of the United States and its allies and partners;
(3)
commends the Trump administration for taking resolute military action and praises the bravery of United States servicemembers who participated in Operation Midnight Hammer;
(4)
concurs that President Trump's efforts to reestablish deterrence are aimed at achieving lasting peace in the Middle East and worthy of consideration for the Nobel Peace Prize;
(5)
reaffirms the right of the United States Government to take any necessary measures to prevent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons;
(6)
commends Israel for its targeted strikes under Operation Rising Lion against Iran’s nuclear facilities, ballistic missile infrastructure, and regime targets, including the Natanz enrichment facility and missile launchers, and recognizes these actions are critical to neutralizing existential threats to Israel and its allies; and
(7)
condemns the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran for launching missiles at United States forces in Qatar and Iraq, and for launching missile attacks that indiscriminately target Israeli civilians.