Whereas the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has pursued a strategy of strengthening its security, economic, and diplomatic ties with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, which has advanced dramatically over the last decade and poses significant risks to the national interests of the United States;

Whereas the PRC has leveraged economic, security, and political incentives to induce countries to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan, leaving Belize, Guatemala, Paraguay, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as the only countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that retain diplomatic ties with Taiwan;

Whereas the PRC has fostered security relationships with almost every country in Latin America through arm sales, equipment donations, joint exercises, and professional military education exchanges, with the most significant security assistance going to repressive regimes hostile to the national interests of the United States;

Whereas, according to the former commander of the United States Southern Command, Craig Faller, the PRC has trained more military officers in Latin America than the United States annually since 2015, and the PRC’s National Defense University was training five times more personnel from the Latin America and Caribbean region than the United States Army War College as of 2020;

Whereas the PRC is engaged in arm sales with several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Ecuador, Argentina, and Peru, and has donated dual-use equipment, including surveillance equipment from Huawei, ZTE, Dahua, and Hikvision, to several countries in the region;

Whereas PRC-based criminal organizations operate in tandem with transnational criminal organizations in Latin America on illegal wildlife trafficking, money laundering, and the shipment of precursor chemicals for fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, and the PRC has taken insufficient steps to address those activities;

Whereas, in 2015, the PRC surpassed the United States as South America’s largest trade partner;

Whereas the PRC has transformed a $12 billion trade relationship with Latin America in 2000 into a $518 billion trade relationship as of 2024, leading to projections that the PRC could overtake the United States as the region’s largest trade partner by 2035;

Whereas 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have joined the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative, 10 of the 11 South American countries maintain strategic partnerships with the PRC, and 5 Latin American countries have signed free trade agreements with the PRC;

Whereas, at the 2025 China-CELAC Forum, President of Colombia Gustavo Petro announced Colombia's entrance into the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative, its intention to join the BRICS New Development Bank, and its interest in purchasing PRC-made fighter aircraft;

Whereas the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China have loaned more than $120 billion to Latin America since 2005;

Whereas investments from the PRC have been concentrated in strategic sectors including energy, mining, surveillance, and port infrastructure, with the PRC and associated companies funding projects such as the $3.5 billion Chancay mega port in Peru, a $1.3 billion investment in Mexican cloud infrastructure, and $2.72 billion in Mexico’s automobile industry in 2023 alone;

Whereas technology from the PRC has been adopted by repressive regimes, including Maduro’s illegitimate government in Venezuela, to police and intimidate citizens, while other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have increasingly come to rely on PRC-made telecommunications infrastructure, putting sensitive consumer data and government systems at risk;

Whereas the majority of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean do not have an equivalent mechanism to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to conduct oversight of foreign investment in strategic sectors and potential threats to their national interests;

Whereas, despite the predatory nature of loans from the PRC, the poor quality of completed infrastructure projects, and the risk to national interests posed by many projects undertaken by PRC companies throughout the region, the PRC touts itself to Latin American and Caribbean audiences as a reliable partner focused on mutually beneficial partnerships, successfully amplifying that message through Spanish and Portuguese media content, journalist exchange programs, and high-level diplomacy with Latin American and Caribbean state leaders;

Whereas the People’s Daily has established content-sharing and other partnerships with outlets in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil and recently organized the 2024 China-Latin America and Caribbean Media Cooperation Forum in Rio de Janeiro;

Whereas 247 journalists from 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries were brought to the PRC in April 2024 to induce more favorable coverage of the PRC in the journalists’ home countries;

Whereas Latin American and Caribbean countries now house 44 Confucius Institutes, state-led educational programs that include Chinese language lessons, cultural exchanges, and academic collaborations;

Whereas the dismantlement of the United States Agency for Global Media has limited the operations of the 450 affiliates of Voice of America in Latin America, leaving many people in the region without independent media as the PRC escalates its dissemination of malign propaganda and information operations;

Whereas the PRC has solidified its engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean through its participation and investment in multilateral institutions such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Organization of American States, and the Inter-American Development Bank;

Whereas President Xi Jinping has visited the Latin America and Caribbean region six times since 2013 and has prioritized high-level engagement, pledging to invite 300 political officials from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States to Beijing annually in 2026 and 2027; and

Whereas, in May 2025, the PRC hosted 17 foreign ministers and 3 heads of state in Beijing for the China-CELAC Forum and made several significant commitments, including a 9 billion yuan credit line for countries in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States: Now, therefore, be it